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Abstract
This paper attempts to estimate possible losses in macroeconomic stabilization due to a move from
ination to exchange rate targeting on an example of the Czech Republic. The authors use an
estimated New Keynesian policy model, general ination and exchange rate targeting rules, and
representative central bank loss functions to carry out such estimations. The authors nd that for
the Czech Republic moving from the historically applied ination targeting to optimized exchange
rate targeting should not involve any signicant losses in macroeconomic stabilization. However, the
Czech National Bank could improve its stabilization outcomes while remaining an ination targeter.
This requires the Czech National Bank to respond stronger to increasing expected future ination
and be less concerned about an opening output gap when adjusting its policy rate. Moving then
from such optimized ination targeting to optimized exchange rate targeting can result in signicant
losses in economic stabilization in the magnitude of 0.4 to 2 percentage points of GDP growth.
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1 Introduction
Many small open economies around the world followed the positive experience of New Zealand with
macroeconomic stabilization and currently apply ination targeting as their monetary policy regime,
including the Czech Republic. The on-going trade and monetary integration within Europe constitutes
an example for possible future economic integration in other worlds regions. By joining the European
Union (EU), the European countries commit to further, monetary integration and eventual adoption
of the euro sometime in the future. Those of the European countries that will be applying ination
targeting before taking the steps towards the euro adoption will have to, at some point, switch from
ination to exchange rate targeting. This can occur with the entry into the ERMII or later within the
ERMII. In general, moving from ination to exchange rate targeting decreases the autonomy of domestic
monetary policy for a given country. This could exacerbate the countrys macroeconomic stability and
have negative implications for the countrys nancial stability and economic growth. However, the
extent of the exacerbation is an empirical matter specic to each country and could, in some cases,
prove to be negligible.
This paper outlines a possible methodology for estimating the e¤ects of moving from ination to
exchange rate targeting on macroeconomic stabilization using the example of the Czech Republic. The
methodology involves an estimated New Keynesian policy model for the Czech Republic using quarterly
data from 1995 to 2007, typical specications of ination targeting and exchange rate targeting rules,
and a representative loss function for the central bank. The estimated open-economy model for the
Czech Republic has a domestic and an exogenous foreign block describing the macroeconomic dynamics
in the euro area. The properties of the model are studied through the impulse response analysis. The
accompanying variance decomposition reveals that despite the exchange rate shock having the largest
estimated size its impact on the Czech output gap and ination is smaller than the impact of any of
the domestic shocks. The latter appear to be almost equally important with the domestic supply shock
slightly dominating. The importance of external developments for the Czech economy is illustrated by
the e¤ects of a foreign demand shock which appears to be the most inuential force behind variations
in Czech ination. Treating the estimated model as a set of constraints we optimize, in turn, the
ination targeting and exchange rate targeting rule using a representative central bank loss function.
This analysis implies that, for the Czech Republic, moving from the current ination targeting rule to
an optimized exchange rate targeting rule would not induce any signicant losses in macroeconomic
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stabilization. However, the Czech National Bank can further improve its macroeconomic stabilization
e¤orts by increasing its response to expected future ination and decreasing its response to the current
output gap, while adhering to current interest rate smoothing. Moving from such optimized ination
targeting to optimized exchange rate targeting would involve losses in macroeconomic stabilization
approximately in the range of 0:4 to 2 percentage points of GDP growth.
The literature has been extensively dealing with the appropriate choice between exchange rate and
ination targeting regimes for a given country, see e.g. Svensson (1997) for an early discussion on
Norway. We, on the other hand, do not question or investigate the initial choice of ination targeting
and take it as given, and look ahead in the context of the European integration process. This is similar
to Karam et al. (2008) who investigate the cost and benets of adopting euro using a calibrated medium-
size DSGE1 model focusing on the Central and Eastern Europe. They nd that although the monetary
union has the benet of eliminating nominal exchange rate shocks, the loss of the bu¤ering role of the
nominal exchange rate leads to greater volatility in domestic output and ination. However, they point
out that the costs are likely to decline over time, due to accelerated convergence as a result of the
monetary union membership. The convergence process and challenges for monetary policy concerning
the Czech Republic have been recently analyzed by Allard and Munoz (2008), and Bruha at al. (2007)
using calibrated DSGE models. And, Benes et al. (2005) look into the desired properties of a forecasting
DSGE model e¤ectively describing the convergence process in the Czech Republic. Our papers focus is
thus di¤erent as we take the move to exchange rate targeting as the benchmark change for the currently
applied ination targeting regime of monetary policy as opposed to the rather irreversible adoption of
the euro, and use an empirical DSGE model tted to the Czech data rather than a calibrated model to
investigate the aforementioned policy issue.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the employed structural
model and outlines its microfoundations. Section three describes the data and chosen estimation method.
Section four presents the estimations results and their discussion, and section ve carries out the impulse
response analysis. Section six strives to estimate the losses in macroeconomic stabilization due to a move
from ination to exchange rate targeting. Section seven concludes.
1Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
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2 Model
This section describes theoretical underpinnings of the open-economy model that we estimate for the
Czech Republic. It consists of two blocks a small open economy (the Czech Republic) and the rest
of the world (approximated by the euro area economy). Let Etxt+1 denote the rational expectation
forecast of xt+1 conditional on the information set available to the forecasting agent at time t. The
equation describing ination dynamics is modelled by the following "hybrid" Phillips curve2:
t = Ett+1 + (1  )t 1 + yyt + yEtyt+1 + qqt 1 + AS;t (1)
where t is CPI ination, yt is the output gap, qt is the real exchange rate, and AS;t is an autocorrelated
aggregate supply (AS) shock. Although allowing for an inertial e¤ect by giving a non-zero weight to
t 1 in Equation (1) was initially empirically motivated, the e¤ect can be derived from a staggered
price-setting mechanism, where a proportion of rms use a naïve, backward-looking rule to forecast
ination. The inertial e¤ect also arises as a consequence of a Calvo-type price setting mechanism, with
partial indexation to last periods ination. For explicit derivation of the hybrid Phillips curve, see e.g.
Christiano et al. (2001). The empirical usefulness of the hybrid specication has been advocated in
e.g. Fuhrer and Moore (1995). Further, CPI ination increases in response to a positive output gap
and an increasing marginal cost of production. We also assume that inationary pressures intensify if
it is expected that opening of the output gap will accelerate in the next period, similarly as Svensson
(2000). The e¤ect of the exchange rate on CPI ination is exercised directly through the domestic
currency price of imported nal goods, and the domestic currency price of the imported intermediate
inputs. Eventually, the exchange rate will also a¤ect nominal wages via the e¤ect of CPI ination on
wage setting. In either case, the exchange rate will a¤ect the cost of domestically produced goods and
ination in the prices of domestically produced goods (see e.g. Svensson, 2000). For empirical reasons
we use the specication with the rst di¤erence in real exchange rate as in Giordani (2004), and work
with an one-period lagged value to capture the exchange rate pass-through.
The output gap dynamics is described by the following aggregate demand (IS) equation:
yt = yEtyt+1 + (1  y)yt 1   r (rt 3   Et 3t 2) + qqt 2 + qyt + IS;t (2)
2The term hybrid relates to the fact that the Phillips curve is backwards, as well as forward-looking in ination.
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where rt is the interest rate and IS;t an autocorrelated aggregate demand shock. One can see from
Equation (2) that the output gap depends on its expected value one period ahead and its lagged
value, where the relative impact is determined by the size of y. The forward-looking term is due to
householdsinter-temporal optimizing behavior and the lagged term arises as a result of consumption
habit formation, or a costly adjustment of the capital stock under inter-temporal optimization, see e.g.
Clarida et al. (2002) and Christiano et al. (2001) for further details. When the interest rate increases,
consumption today in terms of consumption tomorrow becomes more costly, leading to a reduction
in current domestic demand. Moreover, the interest rate a¤ects the user cost of capital, inuencing
investment demand. Aggregate demand is thus inuenced through intertemporal substitution e¤ects
(by the real interest rate), and through intratemporal price e¤ects (by changes in the real exchange
rate). The presence of the real exchange rate and foreign output captures the changing export (and
import) demand. More specically, the net exports are assumed to increase with depreciating domestic
currency (increase in qt) and an increasing foreign output gap yt . The motivation for the open-economy
IS equation can be found in Monacelli (2005), Clarida et al. (2001), and Svensson (2000). The lag-length
selection of variables is motivated empirically, and has been performed in an encompassing manner using
the BIC criterion. Further, we have imposed the restriction that the impact of exchange rate changes
is faster than the impact of real interest rate changes. The latter is a stylized fact which holds for most
small open economies including that of the Czech Republic (see e.g. Buncic and Melecky, 2008).
For the specication of the monetary policy (MP) reaction function, we use a Taylor-type rule that
considers only the domestic output gap and domestic ination, which has been found empirically plau-
sible3 and reasonably robust to di¤erent model structures (see Svensson, 2000). In some circumstances,
the Taylor rule can also be used to describe optimizing behavior (see Benigno and Benigno, 2003). A
forward-looking version of the Taylor rule is employed to emphasize a central banks focus on future
ination when adjusting its monetary policy instrument
rt = rrt 1 + (1  r)
 
 Ett+1 +  yyt

+ MP;t (3)
where MP;t is assumed to be a white-noise process.
4 The specication in (3) implies that the monetary
3Empirical validation of this can be sought in, for example, Giordani (2004), who includes rt , 

t and y

t , but nevertheless
nds that only rt receives a non-zero weight in the monetary policy reaction function in his model for Canada. In the
models estimated by Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) and Lubik (2005), changes in the nominal exchange rate were included
in the monetary policy reaction function of the central bank, however, no statistical evidence was found to suggest that
the monetary policy authority reacted to exchange rate uctuations. We thus decided to exclude foreign variables from
the monetary policy reaction function.
4An i:i:d specication of the monetary policy shock is a common assumption in the literature, see Smets and Wouters
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authority responds to expected ination one period ahead and the current output gap, while at the
same time adhering to a certain degree of inertia in rt.
Finally, the real exchange rate, qt; needs to be described to close the model. The real exchange rate
in logs is dened as qt  st + pt   pt, where st is the log of the nominal exchange rate, and pt and pt
are the foreign and domestic price levels in logs. We adopt an assumption common in the literature of
the exchange rate evolving according to real UIP. The UIP condition is generally stated as an identity
over the log of the exchange rate and interest rates, with the exchange rate expressed as the ratio of
domestic to foreign currency units. Since the model becomes stochastically singular if UIP is left as an
identity in (4), it is necessary to either add a shock or evaluate the log-likelihood function excluding the
exchange rate equation. We follow the former approach, similar to Justiniano and Preston (2004) and
McCallum and Nelson (2001)
Etqt+1 = (rt   Ett+1) 
 
rt   Ett+1

+ RER;t (4)
where RER;t is an autocorrelated exchange rate shock. For more details regarding the empirical prop-
erties of UIP, see the studies by Ferreira and Leon-Ledesma (2007), Chinn and Meredith (2004), and
Mark and Moh (2001).
The foreign (euro area) economy, which is used as a proxy for the world economy, is modelled
according to the NKPM that was recently employed by Cho and Moreno (2006). This model consists
of the following three equations:
t = 

Et

t+1 + (1  )t 1 + yt + AS;t
yt = 

yEty

t+1 + (1  y)yt 1   (rt 6   Et 6t 5) + IS;t (5)
rt = 

rr

t 1 + (1  r)
 
 Et

t+1 +  

yy

t

+ MP;t
The specication of the closed economy model for the euro area is analogous to that for the domestic
economy, with the impacts of foreign variables on domestic ination and the output gap excluded.
Notice that the lagged e¤ect of the real interest rate on the output gap is empirically motivated using
the BIC selection criterion. Having a structural model for the foreign economy enables a structural
identication of foreign shocks rather than working with reduced-form shocks.
The model described by Equations (1) to (5) species the complete two-block structure that we
(2003) and Del Negro et al. (2005).
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consider, with the foreign block being exogenous to the domestic one.
3 Data and Estimation Method
Given the data availability we use quarterly data series from 1995Q1-2007Q4 for the Czech Republic
and from 1981Q1-2007Q4 for the euro area. The output gap is constructed as the deviation of the log of
real GDP from its trend, estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott lter. The deviations are multiplied by
100 to scale up the variance of the series in accord with that of ination and the interest rate (see also
Buncic and Melecky, 2008; and Cho and Moreno, 2006). The real GDP series for the Czech Republic and
the euro area were obtained from Datastream, where the real GDP for the euro area was extrapolated
back to the rst quarter of 1981 using the growth rates of the real GDP series from the Fagan et al.
(2001) dataset. The ination series are constructed as annualized percentage changes in the national
CPI for the Czech Republic and the harmonized CPI for the euro area. Both CPI series were taken from
Datastream. The interest rate series for the Czech Republic is the three-month PRIBOR taken from
the Czech National Banks statistic. For the euro area, the interest rate is the three-month EURIBOR
obtained from Datastream and extrapolated from the rst quarter of 1994 back to the rst quarter
of 1981 using the growth rates of the short-term interest rate from the Fagan et al. (2001) dataset.
The real exchange rate between the Czech koruna and the euro (CZK/EUR) was constructed using the
CZK/EUR exchange rate series, calculated as a cross-exchange rate between the synthetic EUR/USD
rate and the CZK/USD rate obtained from Datastream, and the two CPI series described above. The
real exchange rate series is expressed in logarithms and linearly detrended prior to the estimation. All
data series were demeaned prior to the estimation. Giordani (2004) has recently argued that working
with demeaned data avoids dealing with parameter instability and structural breaks which, he nds,
largely a¤ect the unconditional mean of the series being modeled.
There are several estimation methods used in the literature to t New Keynesian models to the
data. Recently, the most popular method has been the Bayesian estimation which overcomes some
problems of the Full Information Maximum Likelihood method by imposing priors on the structural
coe¢ cientsdistributions (see e.g. An and Schorfheide, 2005; or Buncic and Melecky, 2008). Given the
relatively higher model uncertainly for transition economies, and the fact that system estimators can
be inconsistent if one of the equations in the system is misspecied (see Johansen, 2005) our preferred
estimation method is the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) (see e.g. Gali and Gertler, 1999;
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among others). We used up to three lags of the variables in the system as instruments if needed
while determining the lag-length in an encompassing manner. The long-run heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) covariance matrix weighting the moment conditions in the GMM
estimator is estimated using the Bartlett kernel with the variable New-West bandwidth selection. In
addition, pre-whitening of the moment conditions was applied.
4 Discussion of Estimation Results
The estimates of the model parameters using GMM and the quarterly data for the Czech Republic and
the euro area are shown in Table (1).
Parameter Czech Republic Parameter Euro Area
 0:5961 (0:0650)
  0:7606 (0:1068)

y 0:0976 (0:0366)
 y 0:0316 (0:0171)

y 0:1005 (0:0382)

q 0:1292 (0:0634)

y 0:4895 (0:0381)
 y 0:4721 (0:0403)

r 0:0320 (0:0085)
 r 0:0257 (0:0118)

q 0:0250 (0:0133)

y 0:0399 (0:0157)

r 0:8259 (0:0310)
 r 0:9215 (0:0364)

  1:6880 (0:1065)
   1:7352 (0:3083)

 y 0:3964 (0:1339)
  y 0:1264 (0:0670)

AS 3:5273 

AS 0:9780
IS 1:5710 

IS 1:4720
MP 2:1926 

MP 0:4703
RER 5:8557 RER 0:4265 (0:1314)

Table 1: GMM Estimates of Model Parameter for the Czech Republic and the Euro Area
Consider rst the parameter estimates of the Phillips curve for both the Czech Republic and the
euro area. The estimate of  : 0:59 suggests that the ination process in the Czech Republic has
been more forward- than backward-looking. Also in the euro area, expected ination appears to a¤ect
ination dynamics more than past ination, but even to a larger extent ( estimate of 0:76). This can
be a result of relatively higher competition and associated price changes in the euro area. Or, perhaps
the fact that there was higher uncertainty associated with future ination in the Czech Republic over
1995-2007, so that the Czech agents were choosing to index more to past ination. The sensitivity of
ination to demand pressures, as measured by the output gap, (y) is estimated to be almost three times
higher in the Czech Republic than the euro area (0:10 versus 0:03).5 These estimates imply that an
5We acknowledge the fact that the specications of the estimated equations for the Czech Republic and the euro area
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equal increase in excess demand in the two countries will result in about three times higher an increase
in the marginal cost of production in the Czech Republic compared with the euro area. This can be a
result of Czech rms operating closer to full capacity or facing relatively higher constraints in expanding
their production in the short term, e.g. due to higher credit constraints. In addition, the signicantly
positive estimate of y suggests that to the extent the Czech rms can expect (predict) the increase
in excess demand for their production in the next period, they will add 10 percent of this increase into
current prices. The open-economy Phillips curve estimated for the Czech Republic reveals a positive
exchange rate pass-through at the 10 % signicance level. Namely, the positive estimate of q: 0:12,
implies that a 10 percent increase in the exchange rate (CZK/EUR) will result in a 1:2 percent increase
in Czech CPI ination. This estimate could decline over time as the share of services in the sales of
imports (especially to nal consumers) will increase. However, the competition between importers can
also intensify, or the share of tradeables in the CPI basket can increase as the small economy further
specializes, both of which will boost the exchange rate pass-through. Due to a shorter span of available
observations and the transition nature of the Czech economy, the data t of the estimated Phillips curve
for the Czech Republic is signicantly lower, adjusted R squared of 0:25, than the t for the euro area,
adjusted R squared of 0:83. This is also reected in magnitudes of the estimated standard deviations of
AS shocks for the two countries, where the Czech Republic is estimated to face more than three times
larger supply shocks than the euro area (AS = 3:53 versus 

AS = 0:98).
We now proceed with the IS-curve parameters estimates. The weight on past output gap levels
in the process driving output gap formation is larger in both countries than the weight on the future
output gap (y : 0:49; 

y : 0:47) suggesting that in both economies consumption-habit formation and
costly adjustments of the capital stock result in signicant output gap persistence. The real interest
rates impact on output is fairly similar in magnitude for the two economies where r is estimated 0:032
and 0:026 for the Czech Republic and the euro area, respectively. The maximum e¤ect of the real
interest rate on output is estimated, using the lag-length selection approach, to arrive with a three-
period lag in the Czech Republic and a six-period lag in the euro area. The length of the interest rate
transmission channel is thus longer in the euro area. The e¤ect of changes in the real exchange rate
on net exports and thus output is estimated to arrive with a two-period lag in the Czech Republic, so
that the exchange rate transmission channel appears to be faster than the interest rate transmission
channel, as it is commonly found for small open economies (see e.g. Buncic and Melecky, 2008). The
di¤er and thus the marginal e¤ects were estimated using di¤ering conditioning sets. Nevertheless, we still attempt to make
some comparisons.
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magnitude of the real exchange rate e¤ect on output is, however, estimated to be somewhat smaller
(q : 0:025) than the magnitude of the interest rate e¤ect, r, which could be seen as a bit unusual for
an small open economy. The impact of foreign demand, changes in foreign (the euro areas) output, y ,
is contemporaneous and estimated to be 0:04. This implies that a 10 percent increase in euro areas
output is estimated to result in a 4 percent increase of Czech output. As the real convergence of the
Czech Republic to the EU and the euro area intensies this e¤ect is likely to increase due to higher trade
integration of the two economies. The data t of the open economy IS curve for the Czech Republic,
adjusted R squared of 0:89, is slightly better than the data t of the closed economy IS curve for the
euro area, adjusted R squared of 0:83. Nevertheless, the standard deviation of the IS shock in the Czech
Republic, IS : 1:57, appears to be marginally higher than the standard deviation of the IS shock in the
euro area, IS : 1:47.
The estimated MP reaction functions of a Taylor rule type, show that both the Czech National Bank
(CNB) and the ECB smooth their interest rates to a large extent, where the ECB policy rate, with
r : 0:92; exhibits slightly more intertia than the CNB policy rate, with r : 0:83. The ECB reaction to
expected ination appears to be, on average, higher than that of the CNB, with   and   estimated
at 1:74 and 1:69, respectively. On the other hand, the ECB appears to put less weigh on the output
gap in its reaction function than the CNB where  y and  y are estimated at 0:13 and 0:40. In Svensson
(2000) classication, the ECB thus appears to act as a more conservative central banker compared with
the CNB. In addition, based on the estimates of the standard deviations of the MP shocks for the
Czech Republic and the euro area, MP : 2:19 and 

MP : 0:47, the discretion, within the context of the
assumed monetary policy rule, applied by the ECB seems to be much lower than the discretion applied
by the CNB. Both the monetary policy reaction functions t the data well with the adjusted R squared
for the Czech Republic and the euro area being 0:84 and 0:98.
Finally, the uncovered interest parity condition implies that the standard deviation of the exchange
rate shock, RER, is 5:86: The exchange rate shock also appears to be signicantly positively correlated
over time, with the autocorrelation coe¢ cient of 0:43.
5 Impulse Response Analysis
In the impulse response analysis, we look into how the domestic (Czech) economic variables respond to
individual structural shocks, both domestic and external. We solve the system of equations with rational
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expectations into an VAR form using the QZ algorithm of Sims (2002). Once the reduced-form of the
system is obtained, it can be readily used to generate the impulse responses of endogenous variables to
selected shocks. We focus rst on the responses of the Czech ination, output gap , interest rate and
CZK/EUR exchange rate to domestic shocks, plotted in Figure (1), and then to external shocks, plotted
in Figure (2).
Figure 1: Responses of the Czech output gap, ination, interest rate and CZK/EUR exchange rate to
domestic demand, supply and monetary policy shocks
Consider the rst row of Figure (1). Once the Czech economy is hit by the domestic IS shock the
output gap increases at impact followed by an increase in ination. As the Czech National Bank (CNB)
reacts to increased ination and output gap by raising its interest rate the real interest rate di¤erential
vis-a-vis the euro area becomes even more positive and the CZK appreciates against the euro as a result,
in accord with the postulated real UIP. The interest rate hike and CZK appreciation help contain demand
pressures and ination so that the output gap and ination adjust to their steady-state values in about
25 quarters.
In the second row of Figure (1) we see that as the economy is hit by an AS shock, ination increases
sharply at impact, the CNB reacts to this development by raising its interest rate more than one-to-one
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in accord with its MP rule, so that the CZK appreciates in real terms vis-a-vis the euro. The increased
real interest rate and appreciating CZK make the output gap drop into signicantly negative values.
As the real domestic interest rate becomes negative during the adjustment of ination, the interest rate
and output gap to their steady states, the CZK depreciates in real terms against the euro, shortly before
it settles around its steady-state value.
The third row of Figure (1) shows the IRFs of the domestic variables to a MP shock. An idiosyncratic
increase in the CNB interest rate (a MP discretionary shock) causes by denition spike in the domestic
interest rate at impact, making ination decline into the negative territory. This results in a signicantly
positive real interest rate di¤erential vis-a-vis the euro, and the CZK appreciates strongly in real terms
against the euro. The sharp increase in the real interest rate and sharp real appreciation of the CZK
make the output gap contract signicantly due to declining domestic demand, and foreign demand for
Czech merchandise as a result of lower external price competitiveness.
Figure 2: Responses of the Czech output gap, ination, interest rate and CZK/EUR exchange rate to
foreign demand, supply and monetary policy shocks, and the exchange rate shock.
Next, we inspect the responses to foreign shocks. Consider the rst row of Figure (2). As the foreign
IS shock hits the euro area economy, foreign demand increases and the Czech output gap opens in a
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positive direction. Consequently, ination increases and the CNB reacts by raising its interest rate
more than one-to-one with respect to ination so that the real interest rate increases. Also the ECB
raises its interest rate as the euro area IS shock results in higher euro area ination. Nevertheless, a
positive real interest rate di¤erential emerges in favour of the Czech economy and the CZK appreciates
relative to the euro in real terms. The positive real interest di¤erential arises due to the fact that the
CNB reacts relatively more to the output gap (see  y and  

y in Table (1)) and that the credit channel
of monetary policy in the euro area functions with a longer lag than the credit channel in the Czech
Republic. Ination thus starts declining faster in the Czech Republic and the real interest rate peaks
sooner. As the full e¤ect of the interest rate materializes in the euro area the real exchange rate swings
to the opposite direction so that the euro appreciates vis-a-vis the koruna in real terms before the
exchange rate settles at its steady-state value. The di¤ering reactions of monetary policy and lengths
of transmission mechanisms in the euro area and the Czech Republic cause larger swings in the IRFs of
the Czech variables before they reach their steady states. We will get back to this property later in the
paper.
The second row of Figure (2) shows the responses of Czech variables to the euro area AS shock. After
the euro area AS shock hit the euro area economy, the ECB raises its interest rate inducing an increase
in the real euro area interest rate and depreciation of the CZK relative to the EUR. This depreciation
has a positive e¤ect on Czech net exports and the Czech output gap increases. The positive Czech
output gap and the pass-through of CZK depreciation into Czech CPI result in increased ination.
And, as the CNB reacts to positive ination and the output gap, it increases its interest rate, lowers
the real interest rate di¤erential vis-a-vis the euro and the korunas depreciation slows down. Again,
the di¤ering intensity of the reaction of the CNB and the ECB to ination and positive output gap
together with the di¤ering length of the monetary transmission channels result in signicant swings in
the IRFs of the Czech variables to the euro area AS shock.
Consider now the third row of Figure (2). The discretionary MP shock in the euro increases real
interest rate therein and results in a depreciation of the CZK with respect to the EUR in real terms.
This depreciation fades out slowly in about 18 quarters. As the external price competitiveness of
Czech exports increases and imports become more expensive, the net exports rise and the output gap
opens in a positive direction in the Czech Republic. As a result of the positive output gap and CZK
depreciation the domestic ination increases initially. The positive impact of the korunas depreciation
on the domestic output gap peaks in about 4 quarters and then adjusts quickly back to its steady state.
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The expectation of this rapid adjustment of the output gap downward causes a period of deation (note
the presence of Etyt+1 in Equation (1)) to which the CNB reacts by decreasing its interest rate to
bring the ination response back to its steady state.
The last row of Figure (2) shows the responses of Czech variables to a positive exchange rate shock.
The positive exchange rate shock causes short appreciation of the CZK relative to the EUR which
induces a negative Czech output gap and drop in ination at impact. However, because of the observed,
only short appreciation of the koruna, the Czech output gap is expected to adjust back fast and this
expected positive output gap adjustment causes a short-lived increase in ination after two quarters
to which the CNB reacts by increasing its interest rate. After several quarters, the CNB decreases
its interest rate in order to smooth out the exchange rate response which returns to zero in about 13
quarters.
Finally, Table (2) shows the results of an asymptotic variance decomposition for the domestic vari-
ables in percent. It appears that domestic discretionary MP shock has the largest impact on output
gap uctuations in the Czech Republic, followed by the domestic IS shock and the real exchange rate
shock, while the remaining structural shocks contribute signicantly as well. Ination variations, on the
other hand, are from about 50 percent attributable to the foreign IS shock, and from about 34 percent
to the domestic AS shock whereas other shocksinuences are relatively small. The domestic interest
rate is mostly inuenced by the euro area IS shock as a result of its impact on ination variations in
the Czech Republic, where the CNBs discretionary shock and the domestic AS shock contribute signif-
icantly as well. The exchange rate variability is also most signicantly inuenced by the euro area IS
shock, followed by the exchange rate shock, the CNBs discretionary shock, and the ECBs discretionary
shock.
IS;t AS;t MP;t RER;t 

IS;t 

AS;t 

MP;t
yt 28.2 10.6 35.6 12.3 7.8 0.1 5.7
t 1.1 34.0 4.9 1.6 50.6 0.1 7.7
it 2.12 3.23 7.0 0.35 77.1 0.1 10.1
qt 6.0 3.1 14.3 18.5 45.5 0.1 12.6
Table 2: Asymptotic variance decomposition for the Czech output gap, ination, interest rate and the
real exchange rate
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6 From Ination to Exchange Rate Targeting
In this section we attempt to investigate to what extent a possible move from ination to exchange
rate targeting a¤ects the monetary policy ability to stabilize the economy. We will carry out this
investigation on the example of the Czech Republic using the estimated New Keynesian policy model
discussed above. We divide the investigation into the following steps. First, we assume a representative
loss function for the monetary authority. To examine sensitivity of our ndings to the assumed central
banks loss function we consider a range of alternatives which also help in generalization of our ndings.
Second, we compute the optimized simple rule within the context of the estimated model for the Czech
Republic using the assumed CNBs loss function (a range of plausible loss functions). Third, we assume
that as the Czech Republic proceeds with its integration into the European Monetary Union (EMU),
and as a part of its strategy to adopt the euro in the future, the CNB will switch at some point from
ination to exchange rate targeting. This switch will result in the CNB using the exchange rate as
its nominal anchor and will change the monetary policy reaction function into an interest rate rule
for xed exchange rate regimes. Using the estimated model for the Czech Republic and the assumed
loss function, we optimize the type of an interest rate rule for xed exchange rate regimes suggested
by Benigno et al. (2006). Fourth, we evaluate the di¤erences in the loss function values under the
optimized ination targeting rule and exchange rate targeting rule. We use results of growth regressions
including ination and output volatility as explanatory variables to loosely translate the possible losses
in economic stabilization due to a move from ination to exchange rate targeting into percentage points
of GDP growth. This translation is not aiming to provide any rigorous quantication of the e¤ect of
economic stabilization on growth, but rather illustrate how relevant the e¤ect is, in terms of economic
growth, to substantiate policy relevance of the issue at hand.
We assume that the central bank aims to stabilize ination, around the ination target, the output
gap and the interest rate by minimizing the following loss function
L = var (t   ) + yvar (yt) + ivar
 
it

(6)
where t, t , and it measure ination, the ination target and the nominal interest rate in annualized
terms. This objective function is consistent with the mandates of most central banks.6 As the baseline,
6This objective function is not an approximation of the representative households utility, as we do not attempt to carry
out a full-edged welfare analysis of a representative household in our economy (see Woodford, 2003) and concentrate
on the mandate and preferences of the central bank. The objective function specication in (6) approaches more general
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we assume that the central bank preference parameters are given by y = 0:5 and i = 0:1, so the cen-
tral bank attaches a larger weight to ination stability than to output gap stability, and a small weight
to stability in the interest rate. The interest rate stabilization objective can be seen as a proxy of a pref-
erence for stability in nancial markets. Tinsley (1999), for example, argues that interest rate volatility
may increase term premia and therefore lead to higher long-term interest rates. From a theoretical
perspective, Woodford (2003) shows that the welfare-maximizing policy should aim at reducing interest
rate volatility when there are money transaction frictions or when the central bank wants to avoid the
zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. To inspect the sensitivity of our results to di¤erent prefer-
ences (mandate) of the central bank, we consider three alternative parametrizations of the loss function.
Namely, Ly (; y = 0:9) where the CB puts larger weight on stabilizing the output gap; Li (; i = 0:4)
where the CB puts larger weight on smoothing the interest rate; and L (; y = 0; i = 0:4) where the
central bank cares only about stabilizing ination around the ination target. We do not optimize over
the MP parameter of the monetary policy rule characterizing the degree of monetary policy discretion
within the context of the assumed MP rule. This is because this problem is trivial as any MP > 0
produces a suboptimal value of the central banks loss function. Nevertheless, we consider two cases.
First, when MP = bMP = 2:1926 and the monetary policy retains the historical degree of discretion
for the assumed MP rule (ination targeting or exchange rate targeting rule). Second, when MP = 0
and the MP sticks strictly to the assumed MP rule and no discretion is allowed, i.e. the interest rate
becomes strictly endogenous in our framework.
Further, for the purpose of translating the losses or gains in economic stabilization due to a move
from ination to exchange rate targeting we use the following equation
g = 
p
LERT  
p
LIT

(7)
where g is the GDP growth and  is the coe¢ cient translating the change in the square root of the loss
function value as a result of a move from ination to exchange rate targeting into percentage points
of GDP growth. We use the existing empirical growth literature to calibrate the  parameter. Since,
we are not aware of any study that would estimate jointly the e¤ects of ination volatility, output gap
volatility and interest rate volatility on growth, we use the estimation results of Judson and Orpahides
specication of
Lt =

1  bEt 1P
j 0
bj h(t   )2 + yy2t + ii2ti
as the central bank discount factor b approaches one.
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(1999) and Hnatkovska and Loaya (2003). Judson and Orpahides (1999) estimate the e¤ect of ination
volatility on growth using various specication and di¤erent control variables. Our preferred estimates
are those presented in Table 6 of their paper in which they control for investment as a percent of capital,
the growth rate of per capita human capital, and ination. Since they report a range of estimates for
di¤erent country groups we use as the upper bound their estimate for the full sample of countries,
 :  0:551, and as the lower bound their estimate for the OECD countries,  :  0:135. Hnatkovska
and Loaya (2003), on the other hand, estimate the e¤ect of output gap volatility on growth where our
preferred estimates are those reported in Table 9 in which they control for the e¤ect of the output gap
volatility on growth in crisis periods, initial GDP per capita, secondary enrollment rates, and private
domestic credit over GDP. We consider as the upper bound their IV estimate of  :  0:536, and as
the lower bound their OLS estimate  :  0:1251. Despite the fact that the preferences on ination
volatility, output volatility and interest rate volatility change across our assumed loss functions, using
unied  should not introduce an excessive bias as indicated by similar  estimates produced by Judson
and Orpahides (1999) and Hnatkovska and Loaya (2003). From now on we report only the growth
e¤ect estimates due to changes in economic stabilization using Judson and Orpahides (1999) range of
estimates  = [ 0:135; 0:551]. This is for the sake of brevity and due to the fact that ination volatility
is always dominating in the assumed loss functions of the central bank.
6.1 Evaluating the central bank loss function under optimized, simple ination-
targeting rule
Table (3) shows the estimated coe¢ cients of the forward-looking Taylor rule (see Equation (3)) estimated
by GMM (see also Table(1)), and the optimized coe¢ cients of the forward-looking Taylor rule under the
assumed baseline loss function of the CNB, and some alternatives loss functions columns with headings
 ;  y; r. Note that other coe¢ cients, such as those of the IS and Phillips curve, the real UIP equation
and the euro area block are xed when computing the optimized coe¢ cients of the Taylor rule. Table
(3) also shows the value of the assumed loss functions evaluated at the optimized Taylor rule coe¢ cients
in the column with the heading LIT : The second last column of Table (3) shows the percentage change
in the loss function should the CNB change the existing weights on the future ination, output and
lagged interest rate to the optimized weights. The last column of Table (3) attempts to translate the
percentage change reported in the second last column into percentage points of GDP growth, a measure
that could be more explicit and relevant for the purposes of policy makers.
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Loss function    y r LIT
(LGMM LIT )
LGMM
in % GDP
Historical Discretion, MP = 2:1926
GMM loss function 1:688 0:396 0:826 na 0 0
L (y = 0:5; i = 0:1) 4:963 0:298 0:856 72:114  45:94% [0:41; 1:68]
Ly (y = 0:9; i = 0:1) 3:345 0:205 0:807 99:195  34:13% [0:31; 1:27]
Li (y = 0:5; i = 0:4) 6:1695  0:240 0:890 92:000  44:77% [0:45; 1:83]
L (y = 0; i = 0) 24:415  1:557 0:193 2:240  97:72% [1:14; 4:64]
No Discretion, MP = 0
GMM loss function 1:688 0:396 0:826 na 0 0
L (y = 0:5; i = 0:1) 7:623 0:434 0:939 60:256  49:37% [0:42; 1:73]
Ly (y = 0:9; i = 0:1) 3:519 0:230 0:863 84:097  36:03% [0:31; 1:26]
Li (y = 0:5; i = 0:4) 4:045  0:103 0:893 80:894  47:15% [0:46; 1:86]
L (y = 0; i = 0) 9:232  0:197 0:218 6:133  93:54% [0:98; 4:01]
Table 3: Central bank loss function evaluation under optimized, simple ination-targeting rule
6.1.1 The Case with Historical Discretion
Under the baseline loss function L (y = 0:5; i = 0:1) and the assumption that the CNB retains the
historical degree of discretion, the optimized weight on expected future ination,  : 4:963; is signif-
icantly higher than the estimated historical weight, b : 1:688; which the CNB appears to be putting
on expected future ination when adjusting its interest rate. On the other hand, the optimized weight
on the output gap,  y: 0:298; appears to be lower than the estimated historical weight, b y. The es-
timated degree of interest rate smoothing historically applied by the CNB, br: 0:826; is similar to the
optimized degree of interest rate smoothing, r : 0:856, under the assumed baseline loss function. The
loss function value at the optimized Taylor rule coe¢ cients, i.e.  ;  

y and 

r is 72:114 which is about
45.9 percent lower than the loss function value at the GMM coe¢ cients. If the baseline loss function,
L (y = 0:5; i = 0:1), is representative of CNBs preferences then the CNB can better fulll its objec-
tives by increasing its response to expected future ination, and somewhat decreasing its response to
the current output gap when adjusting its interest rate. This is estimated to generate an increase in
GDP growth of between 0:41 and 1:68 percentage points.
Nevertheless, the CNB preferences about ination stabilization versus output gap and interest rate
stabilization can di¤er. Therefore, we consider some alternative loss function to examine the di¤erences
in the optimized Taylor rule coe¢ cients and the potential CNB losses under these alternatives. If the
CNB were to put relatively more weight on output gap stabilization, assuming Ly (y = 0:9; i = 0:1) ;
the optimized weight on ination in the forward-looking Taylor rule would decrease compared with the
baseline loss function to  : 3:345: On the other hand, should the CNB be putting more weight on
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interest rate smoothing, under Li; or be purely concerned about ination stabilization, under L, the
optimized response of CNB to expected future ination would increase even further compared with the
baseline loss function to 6:170 and 24:415:7 The optimized weight on the output gap in the forward-
looking Taylor rule appears to be lower under all three alternative loss functions Ly; Li and L; i.e. even
if the CNB was more emphasizing output gap stabilization in its preferences. Note that the negative
optimized weights on the output gap under Li and L arise because a positive supply shock increases
ination and decreases the output gap, and supply shocks are the second largest shocks in the system
after the exchange rate shock. Changing the assumed CNBs loss function does not seem to have any
signicant impact on the optimized weight on interest rate smoothing as long as i > 0: Once i is set
to zero the optimized degree of interest rate smoothing drops signicantly and to the value inconsistent
with the historical estimates obtained from the data.
After examining the optimized weights  ;  

y and 

r across the baseline and alternative loss func-
tions, L and Ly; Li and L; it appears that the GMM estimates of the forward-looking Taylor rule,
and thus the weights the CNB have been placing on its components, could be most consistent with the
assumed baseline loss function L with possibly higher preference for output gap stability in the direction
of Ly. The values of the loss functions Ly; Li and L at the respective optimized Taylor rule coe¢ cients
are 99:195; 92:000 and 2:240, where the di¤erences with respect to the loss functions evaluated at the
GMM coe¢ cient estimates are 34:13; 44:77 and 97:72 percent. This means that if the CNBs preferences
were characterized by Ly; Li or L; moving from the historical weights b ; b y and br to the respective
optimized ones would decrease the loss function values by 34:13; 44:77 and 97:72 percent, respectively.
The resulting growth e¤ects could amount to 0:31 to 1:27 percent of GDP under Ly, 0:45 to 1:83 percent
of GDP under Li, and 1:14 to 4:64 percent of GDP under L.
6.1.2 The Case with No Discretion
Considering the baseline loss function L (y = 0:5; i = 0:1) and assuming that the CNB will not apply
any discretion and stick strictly to the forward-looking Taylor rule, when setting its interest rate,
produces an optimized response to expected future ination of  : 7:623. This is signicantly higher
than the estimated historical CNB response and also higher than the optimized response in the case
when the CNB retains its historical degree of monetary policy discretion. Also, the optimized weights
7Optimized policy rules are commonly more aggressive than estimated rules where this result is often attributed to
the fact that the optimized rules do not take into account di¤erent sources of uncertainty that could cause more cautious
policy responses see, for instance, Melecky et al. (2008), Cateau (2005), or Rudebusch (2001).
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on the output gap and interest rate are somewhat higher than their estimated counterparts. While
this was the case for the interest rate weight in the optimized rule with historical discretion as well,
the optimized weight on the output gap is notably higher in the no-discretion case compared with the
historical discretion case. The value of the loss function at the optimized coe¢ cients is 60:256, i.e.
lower than in the case with historical discretion (72:114). If CNB were to adjust its response from the
estimated historical weights to the optimized ones, under L and no MP discretion, the resulting decrease
in the loss function value would be 49:37 percent. This could translate to increased GDP growth by
about 0:42 to 1:73 percentage points.
When we consider the three alternative loss functions and allow no MP discretion, the optimized
weight on expected future ination decreases in cases where the CNB is assumed to have more preference
for output and interest rate stabilization, while it increases in the case of pure preference for ination
stabilization. Overall, the optimized weights on ination tend to be lower than those under historical
MP discretion. This could be due to the fact that there is one less shock in the system (the MP shock)
and thus lower variables volatility overall. The optimized weights on the output gap are generally higher
than in the historical-discretion case, however, the negative signs on the optimized output gap weights
under Li or L prevail. Also, the optimized weights on the past interest rate are generally higher than
in the historical discretion case and thus further from the estimate based on the data, except for Li.
Due to the absence of the interest rate shock in the system, the values of the alternative loss functions
(84:097; 80:894 and 6:133) tend to be lower than in the analogous cases with historical discretion. And,
only the L value at the optimized coe¢ cients is lower than the baseline no-discretion case. If the
CNB were to move from the estimated weights to the ones optimized under Ly; Li or L; the resulting
decrease in the loss function values would be 36:03; 47:15 and 93:54 percent, respectively. The use of
the optimized weights is estimated to increase GDP growth by 0:31 to 1:26 percentage points under Ly,
0:46 to 1:86 percentage points under Li, and 0:98 to 4:01 percentage points under L.
6.2 Evaluating the central bank loss function under optimized, simple exchange
rate-targeting rule
While the Czech Republic progresses in its accession to the European Monetary Union (EMU), the CNB
will have to change its nominal anchor at some point in the future and adopt exchange rate targeting
before the ultimate adoption of the euro. Although it is not certain when in the ERMII this will occur,
we are not concerned with the timing of this change but take it as a milestone at which we measure
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the possible loss in macroeconomic stabilization due to the move from the ination to exchange rate
targeting regime of monetary policy. The change of the nominal anchor of monetary policy will result in
the CNB adjusting its interest rate according to a new interest rate rule for exchange rate targeting. For
the purpose of our exercise we consider an interest rate rule for exchange rate targeting of the following
form
it = i

t +  SEtst+1 + MP;t (8)
consistent with the type of interest rate rules for exchange rate targeting proposed by Benigno et al.
(2006). The CNB is thus assumed to adjust its interest rate one-to-one with respect to the euro area
interest rate, it , and respond to the expected changes in the nominal CZK/EUR exchange rate, st, while
possibly applying some degree of discretion to this rule represented by MP;t. The coe¢ cient  S is
constrained to be positive, and Benigno et al. (2006) argue that for the purpose of a models stability
 S should be around two or higher.
Table (4) shows the baseline and the alternative loss functions for the historical discretion case, i.e.
when the CNB is assumed to retain the same degree of discretion as measured by MP in the context of
the interest rate rule for exchange rate targeting, and for the no discretion case, i.e. when the CNB sticks
strictly to the systematic part of Equation (8), i.e. MP;t drops out, and the interest rate becomes purely
endogenous within our model. The column with the heading  S shows the optimized weight on the
expected future change in the CZK/EUR exchange rate under the relevant loss function. The column
with heading LERT shows the loss functions evaluated at  S and Equation (8) used as the MP reaction
function in the simulation of ination, output gap and interest rate volatility. The column with the
heading (LERT LIT )LIT shows the computed percentage change in the loss function values if the CNB were
to move from the optimized ination targeting rule to the optimized exchange rate targeting rule. The
fth column then strives to translate this change into percentage points of GDP growth. Analogously,
the column with the heading (LERT LGMM )LGMM shows the computed percentage change in the loss function
values if the CNB were to shift from the estimated ination targeting rule based on historical data to
the optimized exchange rate targeting rule, for each type of the loss function. The last column strives
to translate this change in the loss function value into GDP growth gures.
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Loss function  S LERT
(LERT LIT )
LIT
in % GDP (LERT LGMM )LGMM in % GDP
Historical Discretion, MP = 2:1926
L (y = 0:5; i = 0:1) 2:325 129:489 79:56% [ 0:39; 1:59]  2:93% [0:02; 0:09]
Ly (y = 0:9; i = 0:1) 2:325 137:651 38:77% [ 0:24; 0:98]  8:59% [0:07; 0:30]
Li (y = 0:5; i = 0:4) 2:756 213:135 131:67% [ 0:68; 2:76] 27:92% [ 0:23; 0:93]
L (y = 0; i = 0) 2:025 85:629 3723:13% [ 1:05; 4:27]  13:04% [0:09; 0:37]
No Discretion, MP = 0
L (y = 0:5; i = 0:1) 2:429 129:328 114:63% [ 0:49; 1:99] 8:67% [ 0:06; 0:26]
Ly (y = 0:9; i = 0:1) 2:395 137:565 63:57% [ 0:35; 1:41] 4:64% [ 0:04; 0:14]
Li (y = 0:5; i = 0:4) 2:400 211:877 161:91% [ 0:75; 3:06] 38:41% [ 0:29; 1:20]
L (y = 0; i = 0) 2:100 86:621 1312:16% [ 0:92; 3:76]  8:82% [0:06; 0:24]
Table 4: Central bank loss function evaluation under optimized, simple exchange rate-targeting rule
6.2.1 The Case with Historical Discretion
Considering the assumed baseline loss function and a retained historical degree of MP discretion, the
optimized coe¢ cient on the expected future change of the exchange rate in Equation (8),  S ; is 2:325:
Evaluating the loss function at this coe¢ cient value produces value LERT : 129:489 which constitutes a
79:56 percent increase in the loss compared with the case when CNB uses the optimized ination target-
ing rule for adjusting its interest rate, i.e. LIT . This could translate into a 0:39 to 1:59 percentage point
decrease in GDP growth. On the other hand, when one considers the estimated ination targeting rule
as the basis for computation of the possible loss in macroeconomic stabilization, a move to the optimized
exchange rate targeting rule does not involve any signicant loss and, on contrary, appears to produce
mild gain. This improvement in economic stabilization is estimated to increase GDP growth by 0:02 to
0:09 percentage points.
Employing alternative loss functions and assuming the degree of historical discretion produces dif-
ferent results in terms of estimated losses in macroeconomic stabilization. Under the loss function Ly
with a greater emphasis on output,  S is 2:325; the same as if using L. The loss in macroeconomic
stabilization due to a move from the optimized ination targeting rule to an optimized exchange rate
targeting rule is 38:77; about half that in the baseline case, and could translate into a 0:24 to 0:98
percentage point decrease in GDP growth. However, if the estimated ination targeting rule is consid-
ered as the basis, the move to optimized exchange rate targeting rule produces a mild gain in economic
stabilization of 8:59 percent, which could translate into a 0:07 to 0:30 percentage point increase in GDP
growth.
When greater preference for interest rate smoothing is reected in the loss function,  S becomes
2:756, i.e. higher than in the baseline case and so does the estimated loss when moving from the
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optimized ination targeting rule to the optimized exchange rate targeting rule, namely 131:67 percent,
or a likely decrease in GDP growth of 0:68 to 2:76 percentage points. Moving from the estimated ination
targeting rule to the optimized targeting rule, in this case, produces estimated loss in macroeconomic
stabilization of 27:92 percent, likely translating into a 0:23 to 0:93 percentage point decrease in GDP
growth.
If the CNB is assumed to be concerned only about ination stabilization, i.e. under L, the loss in
macroeconomic stabilization, when moving from the optimized ination targeting rule to the optimized
exchange rate targeting rule, becomes enormous of about 1:05 to 4:27 percentage points of GDP growth.
In contrast, moving from the estimated ination targeting rule to the optimized exchange rate targeting
rule produces a gain in macroeconomic stabilization of 13:04 percent, roughly equivalent to a 0:09 to
0:37 percentage point increase in GDP growth.
6.2.2 The Case with No Discretion
Consider now the baseline loss function and no discretion by the CNB to the exchange rate targeting rule.
In this case  S is 2:429, somewhat higher than in the case when the CNB retains its historical degree
of MP discretion, and higher uncertainty makes the CNB respond less aggressively when smoothing the
CZK/EUR exchange rate. When the baseline loss function L is evaluated at  S , it takes the value of
129:328 which indicates 114:63 percent loss with respect to the case when the CNB would be using the
optimized ination targeting rule. This is estimated to translate into a 0:49 to 1:99 percentage point
decrease in GDP growth. Also, when compared with the loss under the estimated ination targeting
rule, the indicated loss remains positive at 8:67 percent, roughly equivalent to a 0:06 to 0:26 percentage
point decrease in GDP growth.
When we assume the three alternative loss functions and no discretion by the CNB, the optimized
exchange rate coe¢ cients under Ly and Li are similar to the baseline case, only under L the optimized
exchange rate response,  S ; decreases noticeably. The estimated loss in macroeconomic stabilization
tends to fall if the CNB preferences on output gap stabilization are increased, and rise if the CNB
preferences emphasize interest rate smoothing or are purely focused on ination stabilization. Namely,
under Ly the computed loss in macroeconomic stabilization due to a move from the optimized ination
targeting to optimized exchange rate targeting is a 63:57 percent, translating into about a 0:35 to 1:41
percentage point decrease in GDP growth. Similarly, under Li moving from the optimized ination
targeting rule to optimized exchange rate targeting rule is estimated to result in a 161:91 percent loss
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in macroeconomic stabilization, roughly equivalent to a 0:75 to 3:06 percentage point decline in GDP
growth. Analogous move under L indicates huge losses as it was the case with historical discretion,
estimated to translate into a 0:92 to 3:76 percentage point decline in GDP growth. If we consider
the CNB moving from the current estimated ination targeting rule to the optimized exchange rate
targeting rule under Ly, Li and L, the losses remain positive of 4:64 and 38:41 percent in the rst
two cases, roughly equivalent to 0:04 to 0:14 percentage point decline and a 0:29 to 1:20 percentage
point decline in GDP growth, respectively. But, a gain in macroeconomic stabilization is estimated,
should CNB preferences be focused entirely on ination stabilization, roughly equivalent to a 0:06 to
0:24 increase in GDP growth.
To sum up, under the assumed baseline loss function, the CNB can improve macroeconomic stabi-
lization of the Czech economy, by about 46 to 49 percent8, achieving roughly a 0:41 to 1:73 percentage
point increase in GDP growth, if it increases its responses to expected future ination from the estimated
1:69 to about 4:96, and by decreasing its response to the current output gap from the estimated 0:40
to about 0:30; while adhering to roughly a similar degree of inertia in interest rate setting as currently
estimated. Should at some point the CNB consider moving from the current ination targeting rule
estimated from the data to an optimized exchange rate targeting rule, the estimated loss in macro-
economic stabilization appears to be negligible. However, if an optimized ination targeting rule is
used as the basis for calculating the loss in macroeconomic stabilization due to a move to an optimized
exchange rate targeting rule, the loss can be as high as 80 to 115 percent. This would translate into
about a 0:39 to 1:99 percentage point decline in GDP growth. In another words, it is estimated that the
CNB can, in current circumstances, adopt exchange rate targeting without incurring signicant losses
in macroeconomic stabilization. But, the CNB can also stick to the currently applied ination targeting
and further optimize its responses to ination and the output gap to signicantly increase its success in
macroeconomic stabilization.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have estimated a structural model comprising the Czech Republic and the euro area.
We have investigated the model dynamics and transmission mechanism through the impulse response
analysis, and used variance decomposition to estimate most inuential shocks for the Czech economy.
8This range relates to the degree of discretion the CNB would prefer to keep where the bounds are zero and the estimated
historical discretion.
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We have found that a foreign demand shock induces relatively more variance in the Czech output and
ination than the real exchange rate shock or any of the domestic structural shocks. Out of the domestic
shocks, the supply shock appears to be the most inuential regarding domestic output and ination
variations. Assuming a representative central bank loss function we have estimated an optimized, simple
ination targeting rule for the Czech Republic which suggests that the Czech National Bank can improve
macroeconomic stabilization by increasing its responses to expected future ination and lowering its
concern about the current output gap. The resulting improvement in macroeconomic stabilization is
estimated to be in the range of 0:41 to 1:73 percentage points of GDP growth. Assuming that the Czech
Republic will at some point switch to exchange rate targeting, we have estimated an optimized, simple
exchange rate targeting rule for the monetary policy rate, and found that moving from the current
ination targeting rule to an optimized exchange rate targeting rule should not involve any signicant
losses in macroeconomic stabilization. However, if we considered the optimized ination targeting rule as
the initial stage for the move to exchange rate targeting the implied loss in macroeconomic stabilization
appeared to be signicant in the rage of 0:4 to 2 percentage points of GDP growth.
Future research could investigate the causes of deteriorating macroeconomic stabilization under the
latter scenario. This would essentially involve examination of the degree of convergence between the
Czech and the euro area economies. In the presented framework, such an examination could then focus
on di¤erences in the sizes of corresponding structural shocks in the Czech Republic and the euro area,
their correlations, and transmission. Regarding the shocks transmission, a statistical comparison of
the corresponding structural coe¢ cients estimated for the Czech Republic and the euro area could be
undertaken. The aim would be to nd microeconomic evidence supporting the potential di¤erences
in the corresponding coe¢ cients and suggesting areas where structural policies could help increase
convergence of the Czech economy towards the euro area.
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